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When you think of impersonation, the first thing to come to 
mind might be a mime mirroring a passerby’s inattentive, hurried 
walk, or an actress in Disneyland dressed as Elsa from Frozen, 
twirling around with a child. As benign and jovial as this type of 
impersonation may be, the law correctly recognizes that 
impersonation has a much darker side.1  
                                                 
1.   See generally Tex. Penal Code § 32.51 (West 2016). 
1
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Traditional criminal impersonation included crimes like posing 
as another person, using someone’s identification card, or 
pretending to be a police officer to arrest another civilian. 2 
However, society changes and the law must evolve to conform with 
new norms. For example, as credit and debit cards became a 
preferred method of payment, Texas criminalized certain conduct 
such as using another’s credit card as your own without the owner’s 
consent.3 Today, the Internet and social media sites are inescapable 
components of modern society. Approximately 1.9 billion people 
use Facebook at least once a month and 800 million use Instagram 
with the same frequency.4 Because social media sites and blogs 
identify users by their real or user name, impersonation and other 
criminal activities have found new waters. 
Following these tidal affairs,5 Texas enacted Penal Code section 
33.07, criminalizing certain online impersonation. 6  Texas is not 
alone in enacting this type of statute,7 and, like similar statutes in 
sister states, the Texas statute is frequently litigated. 8  Recently, 
following the lead of the courts before it, the Waco Court of Appeals 
in Ex parte Maddison concluded that the statute is not overly broad 
or vague and therefore does not violate the First Amendment.9  
Unfortunately, the court failed to recognize the potential impact 
of its precedent in the Maddison decision and the role the Internet 
plays in today’s digital society. Not only is Texas’ online 
impersonation statute unconstitutional, but the Maddison decision 
highlights a First Amendment workaround that ultimately permits 
the State to criminalize legitimate conduct, lump protected speech 
                                                 
2.   TEX. PENAL CODE § 37.11 (West 2016).  
3.   TEX. PENAL CODE § 32.31(a)(1)(A) (West 2016). 
4.   Seth Fiegerman, Facebook Tops 1.9 Billion Monthly Users, CNN (May 3, 
2017, 5:46 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2017/05/03/technology/facebook-
earnings/index.html [https://perma.cc/2LMK-R3H8]; How Many People Use 
Instagram?, MEDIAKIX (Mar. 23, 2017), http://mediakix.com/2017/03/how-
many-people-use-instagram/#gs.mC3OHMii [https://perma.cc/XA4Y-7N9T]. 
5.   WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, CLIFFSCOMPLETE JULIUS CAESAR 134 (Diana 
Sweeney ed., 2nd ed. 2000). 
6.   TEX. PENAL CODE § 33.07 (West 2017).  
7.   See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1450 (West 2017); LA. STAT. ANN. § 
14:73.10 (2017). 
8.   See, e.g., State v. Bishop, 787 S.E.2d 814, 873 (N.C. 2016) (finding a 
similar statute to restrict free speech). 
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into a pile of improperly criminalized conduct, and ignore the 
content of the speech. 
II. FAKE PROFILES AND NUDE PHOTOGRAPHS: MADDISON 
BACKGROUND 
In September 2014, Billy Mack Maddison was indicted10 for 
using his ex-wife’s name to create a Facebook profile “with the 
intent to harm, defraud, intimidate, or threaten her.”11 The charge 
was based on Texas Penal Code section 33.07(a)(1): 
 
(a) A person commits an offense if the person, without obtaining the 
other person’s consent and with the intent to harm, defraud, 
intimidate, or threaten any person, uses the name or persona of 
another person to: (1) create a web page on a commercial social 
networking site or other Internet website.12 
According to the complaint, Maddison created two Facebook 
profiles, one in his ex-wife’s name and one in the name of a man. 
Then, he sent friend requests to his ex-wife’s friends and family and 
posted nude photographs of her on the profiles.13 His ex-wife had 
previously taken and sent these photos to Maddison.14  
In response to the charge and subsequent May 2014 arrest,15 
Maddison filed a writ of habeas corpus in the Nineteenth Judicial 
District Court of Texas in Waco.16 On February 25, 2016, the trial 
court ruled that all of “Penal Code § 33.07 is unconstitutionally 
overbroad because it is a content-based restriction” that criminalizes 
                                                 
10.   Brief for Appellant at 1, Maddison, 518 S.W.3d 630 (No. 10-16-00081-
CR).  
11.   Tommy Witherspoon, Waco Judge Rules Texas Online Impersonation 
Law Unconstitutional, Violates First Amendment, WACO TRIBUNE-HERALD 
(Feb. 26, 2016), https://www.wacotrib.com/news/courts_and_trials/waco-judge-
rules-texas-online-impersonation-law-unconstitutional-violates-
first/article_d633811c-86d0-5dce-a3f5-924ff6591ba0.html 
[https://perma.cc/E4XK-X6SK] (internal quotations omitted). 
12.   § 33.07. 
13.   Witherspoon, supra note 11.  
14.   Id.  
15.   Id.  
16.   Brief for Appellant, supra note 10, at ii, 1.  
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First-Amendment-protected speech. 17  The State appealed to the 
Texas Tenth Court of Appeals in Waco.18  
III. THE WACO APPELLATE COURT’S QUESTIONABLE ANALYSIS IN 
MADDISON 
The appellate court held that because Maddison’s indictment 
was only under subsection (a)(1) of section 33.07, it did not “have 
jurisdiction to declare the entire statute unconstitutional.”19 Thus, 
the trial court lacked sufficient jurisdiction to declare the entire 
statute unconstitutional, and the Tenth Court of Appeals only 
reviewed the constitutionality of section 33.07(a)(1).20  
In a single issue, the State argued that the trial court incorrectly 
granted Maddison’s application for writ of habeas corpus by 
declaring § 33.07 unconstitutional based on overbreadth and 
vagueness.21 Though Maddison’s trial court brief and the State’s 
appellate court brief addressed a Dormant Commerce Clause 
argument, neither the trial court nor the appellate court addressed 
that issue.22 In analyzing the constitutionality of section 33.07, the 
appellate court first addressed the overbreadth issue, followed by 
the vagueness issue.23 
A.  The Waco Court’s Faulty Analysis of Content Neutrality, 
Scrutiny, and Overbreadth 
In finding the statute not overbroad, the opinion analyzed the 
applicable law, the meaning of section 33.07(a)(1), if speech 
restricted by section 33.07(a)(1) is protected by the First 
Amendment, and determined whether intermediate or strict scrutiny 
applied.24 The court reviewed the facial constitutionality challenge 
de novo and presumed the statute was valid, consequently placing 
the burden on the party challenging the statute, Maddison, to prove 
unconstitutionality.25  
                                                 
17.   Id. at 1; Maddison, 518 S.W.3d at 633. 
18.   Brief for Appellant, supra note 10, at i. 
19.   Maddison, 518 S.W.3d at 633.  
20.   Id. at 633, 635.  
21.   Id. at 635.  
22.   Id.  
23.   Id. at 635–40.  
24.   518 S.W.3d at 635–39.  
25.   Id. at 635.  
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Drawing rationale from the Stubbs opinion, the court noted that 
the First Amendment “limits the government’s power to regulate 
speech based on its substantive content.”26 For that reason, in an 
initial step to determine if section 33.07(a)(1) implicated speech and 
could encroach on First Amendment territory, the court looked to 
the plain meaning of the statute.27 Presuming every word in the 
statute had effect, and citing to the Bradshaw opinion, the court held 
that section 33.07(a)(1)’s purpose was clear.28 The court described 
the “forbidden conduct [as] taking another’s identity, without 
consent and with the requisite intent, and using [it] to make certain 
electronic communications.”29 
Because the conduct addressed by the statute concerned speech, 
the court considered if that speech was protected by the First 
Amendment.30 Maddison claimed that the proscribed conduct was 
inherently expressive and protected by the First Amendment.31 As 
a counter, the court noted that speech “integral to criminal conduct 
. . . may be prevented and punished without violating the First 
Amendment.” 32  Ultimately, the Maddison court presumed the 
statute could implicate protected speech.33 
Because the statute could presumably implicate protected 
speech, the court went on to consider whether the statute was 
content based or content neutral.34 A content-based statute “imposes 
differential burdens upon speech because of its content” but a 
content-neutral statute does not. 35  Importantly, content-based 
regulation is subject to strict scrutiny while content-neutral 
regulation is subject to intermediate scrutiny.36 Therefore, content-
based regulation must serve a compelling state interest and employ 
                                                 
26.   Id. (citing State v. Stubbs, 502 S.W.3d 218, 224 (Tex. App.—Houston 
[14th Dist.] 2016, pet. ref’d)). 
27.   Id. at 636. 
28.   Id. at 636–37 (citing Ex Parte Bradshaw, 501 S.W.3d 665, 673 (Tex. 
App.—Dallas 2016, pet. ref’d)). 
29.   Id. at 637 (internal quotations omitted) (citing Bradshaw, 501 S.W.3d at 
673).  
30.   Id.  
31.   Id. at 637 (quoting Ex parte Thompson, 442 S.W.3d 325, 334 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 2014)). 
32.   Id. (quoting Bradshaw, 501 S.W.3d at 674).  
33.   Id. at 638.  
34.   Ex Parte Maddison, 518 S.W.3d 630, 638 (Tex. App.—Waco 2017, pet. 
ref’d). 
35.   Id.  
36.   Id.  
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the least speech-restrictive means to achieve its goal, whereas 
content-neutral regulation need only promote a significant 
government interest and not substantially burden speech more than 
necessary to further that interest.37 Under either level of scrutiny, 
the court suggested that an “overbreadth challenge will rarely, if 
ever, succeed against a statute ‘that is not specifically addressed to 
speech or to conduct that is necessarily associated with speech (such 
as picketing or demonstrating).’”38 If the court finds a reasonable 
statutory construction rendering the statute constitutional, the 
statute will be upheld.39 
Without providing any original analysis, the court summarized 
the Stubbs and Bradshaw courts’ reasoning in explanatory 
parentheticals and asserted that section 33.07(a)(1) does not restrict 
a certain topic, subject matter, or speech, or otherwise target a 
particular viewpoint.40 For that reason, following the courts before 
it, the court concluded that section 33.07(a)(1) was content-neutral 
and, thus, subject to intermediate scrutiny.41  
Applying intermediate scrutiny, and again deferring to the 
Bradshaw court’s reasoning, the court claimed that the statute 
served a significant governmental interest by protecting Texas 
citizens from impersonation, fraud, and abuse online. 42 
Furthermore, the court asserted that the statute served a First 
Amendment interest by ensuring that online speech is actually made 
by the purported user. 43  Finally, the court concluded that 
Maddison’s hypothetically unconstitutional applications were 
insubstantial when compared to constitutional applications.44 For 
these reasons, the court held that Maddison failed to prove section 
33.07(a)(1) facially unconstitutional.45  
In summary, after reviewing the matter de novo, the court 
concluded that any speech associated with conduct prohibited by 
section 33.07(a)(1) may be silenced without violating the First 
                                                 
37.   Id. at 635–36.  
38.   Id. at 636 (quoting State v. Johnson, 475 S.W.3d 860, 865 (Tex. Crim. 
App. 2015)). 
39.   Madison, 518 S.W.3d at 636. 
40.   Id. at 638 (quoting Stubbs, 502 S.W.3d at 231) (internal quotations 
omitted).  
41.   Id. at 639.  
42.   Id. (quoting Bradshaw, 501 S.W.3d at 676–77). 
43.   Id. (quoting Bradshaw, 501 S.W.3d at 676–77). 
44.   518 S.W.3d at 639. 
45.   Id. 
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Amendment.46 Additionally, the court held that even if the statute 
affected some protected speech, it was insignificant in comparison 
to the legitimate sweep of the statute.47 Thus, the court determined 
that the statute did not materially conflict with First Amendment 
protections and was not unconstitutionally overbroad.48 
B.  The Waco Court’s Limited Analysis of Vagueness 
The majority opinion’s brief analysis of vagueness relied 
heavily on the reasoning from the Bradshaw court.49 The Bradshaw 
court explained that a statute is unconstitutionally vague if “persons 
of common intelligence” must guess at its meaning.50 Though a 
statute does not have to be exactly precise, all criminal laws “must 
give fair notice about what activity is made criminal.” 51 
Furthermore, the law must be definite enough to avoid chilling 
protected expression.52 As related to standing and a defendant’s 
permissible arguments, a person may complain of the statute’s 
application to other people’s speech if it is unclear if the statute 
unconstitutionally regulates a substantial amount of free speech.53 
The court applied this law to Maddison’s contention that the 
“harm” standard set forth in section 33.07(a)(1) was too vague.54 
Ultimately, the court again agreed with Bradshaw precedent and 
held that the harm standard was not vague. 55  To reach this 
conclusion, the opinion pointed out that the Texas Penal Code 
“define[d] harm generally as anything reasonably regarded as loss, 
disadvantage, or injury” and that Chapter 33 of the same code 
contained its own definition which included “injury that might 
reasonably be suffered as a result of the actor’s conduct.”56 The 
opinion also noted that harm is a common word with a common 
                                                 
46.   Id. at 635–38.  
47.   Id. at 638–39.  
48.   Id. at 639. 
49.   Ex Parte Maddison, 518 S.W.3d 630, 639–40 (Tex. App.—Waco 2017, 
pet. ref’d). 
50.   Id. at 640 (quoting Bradshaw, 501 S.W.3d at 677) (internal quotations 
omitted).  
51.   Id. (quoting Bradshaw, 501 S.W.3d at 677) (internal quotations omitted). 
52.   Id. 
53.   Id.   
54.   Id.; TEX. PENAL CODE § 33.07(a)(1) (2017) (“with the intent to harm…”).   
55.   Maddison, 518 S.W.3d at 640.  
56.   Id. (quoting Bradshaw, 501 S.W.3d at 678) (internal quotations omitted).  
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definition. 57  Apparently satisfied that the combination of these 
definitions was sufficiently definite to give the average person fair 
notice of the prohibited conduct, the opinion concluded that section 
33.07(a)(1) was not unconstitutionally vague.58 
In summary, the court determined that the contended harm 
standard was not unconstitutionally vague because the Texas Penal 
Code had a general definition, Chapter 33 of the Penal Code had a 
more specific definition, and “harm” is a common word.59 Because 
the court established that section 33.07(a)(1) is not 
unconstitutionally broad or vague, it reversed the trial court.60 
C.  The Dissent: A Glimmer of Hope 
Chief Justice Gray was the sole dissenter in Ex parte 
Maddison.61 Though he decided there was “no reason to belabor the 
legal points” upon which he based his analysis, he suggested that Ex 
parte Thompson,62 Ex parte Lo,63 and Texas v. Johnson64 set forth 
the correct framework.65 By his analysis, the majority’s main error 
was in concluding that section 33.07(a)(1) is content neutral; he 
would have determined that section 33.07(a)(1) is content based.66 
Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, he argued that a court must 
look into the content of the speech or the intent of the speaker to 
determine if the statute has been violated. 67  To illustrate his 
reasoning, he suggested, hypothetically, that the statute would not 
prohibit a post or page in favor of a political candidate even if it 
appeared to be from, or made by, someone else.68 However, the 
same statute would prohibit an almost identical post or page 
disfavoring the political candidate. 69  More complicated, Chief 
Justice Gray suggests, would be a photograph of a candidate with a 
                                                 
57.   Id. (quoting Bradshaw, 501 S.W.3d at 678) (internal quotations omitted). 
58.   Id.  
59.   Id. 
60.   Id.  
61.   Id. at 640–41.  
62.   Thompson, 442 S.W.3d at 325. 
63.   Ex parte Lo, 424 S.W.3d 10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). 
64.   Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). 
65.   Maddison, 518 S.W.3d at 640–41 (Gray, C.J., dissenting).  
66.   Id. at 641.  
67.   Id.  
68.   Id.  
69.   Id.  
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caption underneath stating, “‘I vote for life.’”70 Such a post would 
mandate inspection of the content and poster’s intent because it is 
unclear if the poster meant to harm or help the featured candidate.71  
For these reasons, the dissent concluded that the statute was 
content-based and must be “presumed invalid and withstand strict 
scrutiny,” requiring the state to establish its validity.72 Because the 
state did not establish validity, Chief Justice Gray opined that the 
trial court should be affirmed.73 
IV. CORRECTED ANALYSIS: WHERE THE WACO COURT OF APPEALS 
WENT WRONG AND MADDISON’S EFFECTS 
As Chief Justice Gray concluded, the majority’s main error was 
failing to label the statute as content-based and apply the appropriate 
level of scrutiny: strict scrutiny. 74  This failure stems from the 
court’s inability to recognize the over-inclusiveness of the statute 
and the modern role of the Internet. Ultimately, this inability allows 
the State government to circumvent the First Amendment and 
silence protected speech.  
A.  Content-Neutrality, Scrutiny, Overbreadth, and Vagueness 
Revisited 
1. Content Neutrality & Scrutiny: The Statute is Content-Based 
Section 33.07(a)(1) is content-based because a court must assess 
the content of the speech to determine if it is harmful or harmless. 
In doing so, a court must necessarily distinguish between favored, 
harmless, and disfavored, harmful, speech.  
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has stated that “‘[i]f it is 
necessary to look at the content of the speech in question to decide 
if the speaker violated the law, then the regulation is content 
based.’” 75  As an illustration, it explained that “a statute that 
prohibits an adult from communicating with a minor via the internet 
is content-neutral, but a statute that prohibits an adult from 
                                                 
70.   518 S.W.3d at 641 n.1 (Gray, C.J., dissenting). 
71.   Id. (Gray, C.J., dissenting). 
72.   Id. at 641.  
73.   Id.  
74.   Id. at 640.  
75.   Thompson, 442 S.W.3d at 345 (quoting Lo, 424 S.W.3d at 15 n.12).  
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communicating with a minor via the internet in a sexually explicit 
manner is content-based.” 76  Almost identically, a statute that 
prohibits creating a web-page or profile in the name or persona of 
another person would be content-neutral, but a statute that prohibits 
creating a web-page or profile in the name or persona of another 
person in a harmful manner is content-based.77 Most obviously, it 
would be almost impossible to know, without a self-incriminating 
admission, if a defendant intended to cause harm without looking at 
the page or profile created and the writings, posts, expressions, and 
other activities on that page. 
More complex is the situation in which an Internet page or 
profile is created in the name or persona of another person with the 
intent to cause harm for a “legitimate” purpose.78  For example, 
many political activists create pages in the name or persona of 
politicians, some of which include “profile” or “cover” photos of 
these politicians, in an effort to remove that person from office.79 
Additionally, many satirical websites use the name and persona of 
politicians to intentionally cause political harm to the named 
persons. 80  For example, The Onion’s website, under the sub-
heading “The Trump Documents,” includes pages dedicated to both 
President Donald Trump and Vice President Mike Pence. 81 
Included on those pages are documents like fake emails that appear 
to be from President Trump or Vice President Pence. 82  These 
illegitimate documents serve as legitimate political and social 
commentary which are protected by the First Amendment.83  
                                                 
76.   Id. (citing Lo, 424 S.W.3d at 15 n.12).  
77.   See id.  
78.   Legitimate means “[c]omplying with the law; lawful.” Legitimate, 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). Significantly, the Texas online 
impersonation statute does not carve out an exception for “legitimate,” though 
harmful, conduct. See also § 33.07(a)(1).  
79.   See, e.g., Donald J Trump (@thetotallyrealdnaldtrump), FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/thetotallyrealdonaldtrump/ [https://perma.cc/8T82-
UEWY]. 
80.   See, e.g., The Trump Documents, THE ONION, 
http://www.theonion.com/trumpdocuments [https://perma.cc/6QPX-A5WL]. 
81.   Id.  
82.   See Donald Trump, THE ONION (MAY 22, 2017, 9:16 AM), 
https://www.theonion.com/donald-trump-1819594227 [https://perma.cc/46UN-
CD6N].  
83.   Id.; see also Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948) (“We do not 
accede to appellee’s suggestion that the constitutional protection for a free press 
applies only to the exposition of ideas . . . . What is one man’s amusement, 
teaches another’s doctrine.”). 
 
10
Mitchell Hamline Law Journal of Public Policy and Practice, Vol. 40 [2019], Art. 3
https://open.mitchellhamline.edu/policypractice/vol40/iss1/3
Spring 2019] Kelly 61 
 
Certainly, if The Onion were charged under section 33.07(a)(1), 
a court would be required to analyze the content of the page and 
associated speech to determine if it is harmless or harmful speech. 
And, laws distinguishing “favored [(harmless)] speech from 
disfavored [(harmful)] speech on the basis of the ideas or views 
expressed are content-based.”84 While a defender of this legislation 
may claim that speech is not categorically prohibited because of the 
idea expressed and is instead prohibited based on the harm caused, 
it is the underlying idea or view that causes the harm: but for the 
author’s opinion, standing in opposition to the target’s opinion, 
there would be no case—no “harm” caused, no “crime” committed, 
and no speech suppressed. The law is content-based. 
2. Content Neutrality & Scrutiny: A Possible Justification 
Unaddressed by the Court 
A possible justification, unexplored by the Maddison court, for 
the content-neutral label is the secondary effects rule.85 This rule 
states that in some situations “a regulation can be deemed content-
neutral on the basis of the government interest the statute serves” 
even if it appears content-based and may have “an incidental effect 
on some speakers or messages but not to others.”86 But, the “‘mere 
assertion of a content-neutral purpose [will not] be enough to save 
a law which, on its face, discriminates based on content,’” and, 
instead, the rule requires courts to look into the purpose and effects 
of the law.87 According to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the 
two classic examples of the secondary effects rule are Ward88 and 
Renton.89  
Even ignoring the fact that section 33.07(a)(1) discriminates 
based on content on its face, the statute fails the secondary effects 
test because it hinders protected speech to a much greater extent 
than the ordinances upheld in Ward and Renton. The Ward decision 
                                                 
84.   Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 643 (1994).  
85.   See Thompson, 442 S.W.3d at 346.  
86.   Id. at 345.  
87.   Id. at 346 (quoting Turner, 512 U.S. at 642).  
88.   Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (holding a sound-
level regulation content neutral because it served the purpose of restricting noise 
intrusions to residential neighborhoods). 
89.   City of Renton v. Playtime Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (holding a 
zoning ordinance content neutral because it protected community character by 
disallowing adult theaters).  
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still permitted expression of protected speech, just at a quieter 
level. 90  Mandating a lower volume bans neither the method of 
speech nor the speech itself. Similarly, the Renton decision still 
permitted operation of an adult-theater, just in a different location.91 
Requiring an adult-theater to operate in a different location bans 
neither the method of expression nor the expression itself. In 
contrast, section 33.07(a)(1) and the Maddison decision prohibit 
speakers with a legitimate purpose from exercising their freedom of 
speech in the manner they choose because of the allegedly 
“harmful” ideas expressed. 92  Therefore, even if the court had 
applied the secondary effects rule, or if a party makes that argument 
in the future, it could not and cannot save section 33.07(a)(1) from 
classification as content-based.  
 
3. Overbreadth and Vagueness: The Statute is Facially 
Unconstitutional 
Because the Maddison court should have found section 
33.07(a)(1) to be content-based, it must be examined under a strict-
scrutiny lens. Applying strict scrutiny, the statute must serve a 
“compelling state interest” and utilize “the least speech-restrictive 
means to achieve its goal.”93 While protecting people’s identity is 
certainly a compelling state interest, the law does not employ the 
least restrictive means to achieve that goal. 94  Here, because the 
vagueness of the statute affects its overbreadth, vagueness is 
discussed in conjunction with overbreadth. 
First, the court misunderstands the roles of the Internet today. In 
an eerily-foreshadowing sentence, the Maddison court stated that 
law directed at activities not “necessarily associated with speech 
(such as picketing or demonstrating)” will “rarely, if ever, 
succeed.” 95  This statement serves only to highlight the court’s 
failure to understand the modern digital world. Today, the Internet 
is the new venue for political discourse, and “political debate and 
                                                 
90.   See Ward, 491 U.S. at 796–803.   
91.   See Renton, 475 U.S. at 48–55.  
92.   See TEX. PENAL CODE § 33.07(a)(1) (West 2017); Maddison, 518 S.W.3d 
at 640; see also Turner, 512 U.S. at 643.  
93.   Maddison, 518 S.W.3d at 635–36. 
94.   See id.  
95.   Id. at 636.  
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discussion is . . . a regular fact of digital life for many social media 
users . . . .”96 For that reason, the Internet, in many situations, is on 
par with picketing or demonstrating.97 Because of the majority’s 
misunderstanding, they failed to appropriately weigh the 
consequences of limiting such demonstrations. 
Furthermore, inclusion of the language “or other Internet 
website” in section 33.07(a)(1) means that all named Internet sites 
and pages could be subject to this law and not just profiles and pages 
on Facebook, Instagram, and MySpace. 98  Such sites and pages 
include political ads,99 blogs,100 discussion websites,101 memes,102 
and more. 103  As a result, not only does the statute apply to a 
significant amount of conduct, including legitimate conduct, but the 
statute also applies to almost every conceivable website.104  
Additionally, the vague “harm” standard used in section 
33.07(a)(1) expands the statute’s already wide net, unnecessarily 
catching legitimate conduct. 105  The court claims that the term 
“harm” is not overly vague because it has three definitions: the 
general penal code definition, the Chapter 33 definition, and the 
common usage definition. 106  However, the general definition 
includes “anything reasonably regarded as loss.”107 The Chapter 33 
definition includes “various types of damage […] and also any other 
                                                 
96.  . Maeve Duggan & Aaron Smith, The Political Environment on Social 
Media, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Oct. 25, 2016), 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/10/25/the-political-environment-on-social-
media/ [https://perma.cc/WC3T-LRKJ]. 
97.   See id; see also Maddison, 518 S.W.3d at 636.  
98.   See TEX. PENAL CODE 33.07(a)(1) (West 2017).  
99.   See, e.g., Hire the Donald, HUM CREATIVE, http://hirethedonald.com 
[https://perma.cc/GKB2-XJZE].  
100.   See, e.g., Daniel O’Brien, My Brief Time as Trump’s Campaign 
Manager, CRACKED (Mar. 6, 2016), http://www.cracked.com/blog/what-i-
learned-accidentally-managing-trumps-campaign/ [https://perma.cc/N6WC-
ZFSW].  
101.   See, e.g., weallhaveourthing, Kanye West, REDDIT, 
https://www.reddit.com/r/Kanye/comments/7a1w6z/kanye_west/ (last visited 
Nov. 1, 2017).  
102.   See, e.g., Anonymous, Hillary Clinton Meme, IMGFLIP, 
https://imgflip.com/i/17szgr [https://perma.cc/9TLU-C8VB].  
103.   See, e.g., Comrade Stump, YOUTUBE, 
https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCoWIVzxp6oLjsGMGuzzmxig/feed 
[https://perma.cc/6Z2F-2BED]. 
104.   See TEX. PENAL CODE 33.07(a)(1) (West 2017). 
105.   Legitimate, supra note 78. 
106.   Maddison, 518 S.W.3d at 640.  
107.   Id.  
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loss, disadvantage, or injury.”108 And, the common usage definition 
includes “[i]njury, loss, [and] damage.” 109  These definitions 
encompass just about every type of loss, which at bare minimum 
broadens the applicability of the statute and increases the potential 
for speech restriction. 
In summary, the Internet is a thriving venue for political 
discussion and discourse and requires substantial caution when 
curbing the ability to participate in such expression. 110  Section 
33.07(a)(1) is so vague that it over-includes not only what websites 
the law is applicable to, but also what conduct is made criminal.111 
The statute makes no limitations to this broad applicability and 
carves out no exception for legitimate conduct.112 Therefore, it does 
not employ the least restrictive means to achieve its goal and is 
unconstitutionally overbroad.113 
B.  The First Amendment Workaround: Unconstitutional as 
Applied, Even If Not Facially 
Unfortunately, the Maddison court determined that section 
33.07(a)(1) is not content-based and is not unconstitutionally 
overbroad or vague.114 Consequently, two aspects of the opinion in 
combination create a way for the Texas government to side-step the 
First Amendment, making the statute, at the least, unconstitutional 
as applied in certain scenarios, even if it is not unconstitutional on 
its face.  
The first important aspect is that the court states that “any 
subsequent ‘speech’ related to [the criminalized] conduct is integral 
to criminal conduct and may be prevented or punished without 
violating the First Amendment.”115 Normally, when the underlying 
conduct is truly criminal, stripping constitutional protection from 
speech associated with that conduct is not an issue. But when the 
underlying conduct is made criminal merely because the statute is 
over-inclusive and fails to differentiate between legitimate and 
                                                 
108.   Id.  
109.   Harm, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  
110.   See Duggan & Smith, supra note 96.  
111.   See TEX. PENAL CODE § 33.07(a)(1) (West 2017).  
112.   See id.  
113.   See Maddison, 518 S.W.3d at 635–36.  
114.   Id. at 640.  
115.   Id. at 637.  
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illegitimate purposes, First Amendment protection for associated 
speech is inappropriately waived.  
For that reason, the second important aspect of the opinion is 
that the statute was not found unconstitutionally overbroad or 
vague, even though it sweeps in legitimate conduct. 116  By 
upholding the constitutionality of this statute, the court has 
criminalized that swept-up legitimate conduct. Because that 
conduct is now considered “criminal,” any speech associated with 
it is no longer afforded First Amendment protection.117 Thus, some 
legitimate speech authored in a legitimate way is at risk of attack 
because Texas prosecutors now have the means to circumvent the 
First Amendment.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, Maddison was incorrectly decided. The court should 
have determined that section 33.07(a)(1) was content-based, subject 
to strict scrutiny, and unconstitutionally overbroad. But because the 
court did not fully appreciate the over-inclusiveness of the statute 
and the modern role of the Internet, it missed the mark. As a result, 
the State of Texas is left with a statute that is unconstitutional on its 
face. Whether or not the statute is ultimately adjudicated 
unconstitutional, Texas has been left with a First Amendment 
workaround. This mistake in Texas should act as a warning to all 




                                                 
116.   Id. at 640.  
117.   See id. at 637, 640. 
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